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I. I shall begin with a few observations of a terminological 
nature. This may be all the more in place, considering that the 
words "humanism" and ''humanist" are not as well ingrained in the 
English language as are their equivalents in some other languages. 
Although derived from Latin roots, the two terms have nothing 
directly corresponding to them in classical Latin. But Cicero and 
some other writers used studia humanitatis or studia humaniora for 
the intellectual pursuits-such as reading the historians and poets-
best suited for developing the qualities which Cicero called a man's 
humanitas. During the Italian Renaissance the name umanista 
came to be used for a teacher of the studia humanitatis which now 
included also the study of classics and of moral philosophy. The 
term "humanism" (Humanismus) seems to be an early 19th century 
German invention. It was in origin used for referring to the move-
ment in literature and scholarship beginning, roughly, with Petrarch 
and continued by the umanisti. Also the notion of humanistic 
studies or humanities as a common name for the historical and 
philological disciplines first established itself in Germany in the 
course of the last century. 
Of even more recent origin, it seems, is the use of the word 
"humanism" for denoting an attitude to life which emphasizes the 
autonomy and dignity of man and the value of "humane" relation-
ships between men. 
The value-loaded term "humanism" is, of course, not unrelated 
to the use of the term for the current represented by the humanists 
of the Renaissance or the nco-humanists of the Enlightenment. Not 
all the umanisti championed what we should call a humanist 
philosophy of life. But many did. And if by Renaissance humanism 
we understand a current in the history of European culture which 
is not confined to Italy but counts also such men as Erasmus and 
Thomas More among its representatives, then indeed the ethos of 
this current has much in common with humanism in that sense in 
which I here understand the word. 
In the following I am going to use the term "Renaissance hu-
manism" in a somewhat broader meaning than the received one. 
It shall refer both to the literary and scholarly pursuits of the period 
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which sought their ideals and standards in classical antiquity and 
to an emerging new view of man and his place in the universe. 
Under this use for example Giordano Bruno counts as a figure of 
Renaissance humanism. I do not think this terminology is dis-
torting. I think, on the contrary, that the full historic significance 
of the humanist movement in the narrower and more professional 
sense of the term can be grasped only through considering its reper-
cussions on a philosophy of man and of nature. 
I also wish to plead for a broader use than the traditional one 
of the term "humanist disciplines." I think it convenient to include 
in their orbit the entire study of man and his achievements as a 
being capable of culture. This means not only history and philology 
and what the Germans call Geisteswissenschaften but also the social 
sciences and cultural anthropology. 
Not every science which studies man should be counted among 
the humanistic disciplines, however. In biology and medicine man 
is studied, mainly, not as a being of culture but as a member among 
others of the animal kingdom and thus as belonging to nature. 
This is also partly the point of view of man which psychology takes. 
Psychology therefore is partly natural science-but partly something 
different. 
2. In this essay I shall not be talking about the humanistic 
disciplines-neither in the traditional narrower nor in my proposed 
broader sense of the term. My subject matter is the value-loaded 
notion of humanism-humanism as an attitude to life. 
What is the humanist attitude? The answer that humanism is 
a defense of man, lays emphasis on man's dignity and on human 
values, may serve to elucidate the word but does not go far towards 
explaining the thing. 
I want to say, right at the beginning, that in my opinion our 
question has no univocal answer. The humanist attitude is not a 
historical constant. The question What is Humanism? is perpetu-
ally open. Every era has to try to answer it in its own way from 
the standpoint of a given historical situation.• 
1 The openness of the question What is Humanism? is related to the open· 
ness, as I see it, of the question What is Man? The second question can also 
be formulated What is man's place in the world·order? It is a fundamental 
thought of the Renaissance humanist Pico della Mirandola that man has no 
fixed place in the order of things. Man is free to choose his nature: "he has 
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The task is particularly urgent in periods of great change and 
of contest between the old and the new. It is significant that the 
currents which have become known under the name "humanism" 
have made their appearance in times of crisis or revolution. The 
humanism of the Renaissance was an upheaval against received 
authority and paved the way for reform in religion and a revolution 
in science. The nco-humanism of the Enlightenment must be seen 
against the background of the French Revolution. And the marxist 
or socialist humanism which has emerged in the mid-twentieth 
century is a product of man's selC-refiection in the break and contest 
between late capitalist and socialist forms of society. 
The definition of humanism is therefore a challenge which 
perpetually renews itself. The creative and dynamic nature of the 
task is reflected in the fighting and searching spirit of the humanist 
attitude itself. 
One can set oneself to the task in several different ways. The 
way I am following here will be historical. Or perhaps I should 
better call it quasi-historical. I shall try to sketch a historical per-
spective in a coordinate system of three concepts. These are the 
triad nature-mao-the supernatural. The last member could also be 
referred to as the gods. 
It is not my intention, however, to extract a meaning of hu-
manism from the testimonies of history. Rather, I am going to use 
a preconceived idea of humanism to give significance to certain 
facts of history. I am aware of the dangers of subjectivism con-
nected with this hermeneutic or interpretative endeavor. But I 
think that a certain amount of subjectivity is unavoidable in any 
attempt to rise above the level of bare chronicle to that which a 
scholarly study of history necessarily is: a morphology of events 
which makes intelligible their connections and significance. 
the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish" but 
also "to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine." To man is granted 
"to be whatever he wills." On him are "conferred the seeds of all kinds and 
the germs of every way of life." These ideas are strikingly similar to the exis-
tentialist view that, in man, existence is prior to essence. This is not to say that 
Pico's existentialism is the same as Sartre's nor that my view of the openness of 
the humanist attitude is identical with either of these two philosophies of man. 
(Quotations from The Renaissance Philosophy of Mar~, ed. by Ernst Cassirer, 
Paul Oskar KristeUer, and John Herman Randall Jr., University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1948, p. 225.) 
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3. The life of primitive man is a fight with nature. Man is 
then so to speak at the mercy of his natural environment. Behind 
the visible operation of natural forces he fancies the play of super-
natural powers-some benevolent, others hostile-whom he fears 
and tries to please or to soothe. In this constellation man is not 
important as a determining factor, but is himself determined by 
nature and the supernatural. One could say that humanism was 
born the moment when man started to reflect on his place in the 
world and on his possibilities of sovereign action in relation to 
nature and the gods. A condition of this self-reflection was that the 
pressure exerted on him by the other two members of our triad 
became to some extent alleviated. 
The needed alleviation is not necessarily consequent upon a 
transformation of society from a primitive state of culture to a 
civilization. This important change is, on the contrary, often con-
nected with an enhancement of the role of the supernatural, its 
rise to the position of supreme authority which in minutest detail 
regulates the life of society. The monuments of ancient civilizations 
in the Middle East and in Central and South America remind us 
of this fact. A modern spectator can hardly fail to be impressed 
and shaken by their numinous inhumanity. 
As already noted, the word "humanism" was originally used 
as a name of a current of the Renaissance. But the attitude for 
which the term is also used and which is the object of this essay 
has its origin in ancient Greece. It is no accident that the humanism 
o£ the Renaissance sought its patterns of culture in the Greek and 
Roman civilization, nor that the neohumanism of the Enlighten-
ment discovered its ideals o£ beauty in Hellenistic art and started a 
great vogue of classical scholarship in the European universities. 
One must by no means overrate the rationality and worldliness 
o£ Greek culture. Religious rites and mysteries are deeply charac-
teristic of it. Yet it is also a fact that the pressure o£ religious au-
thority on life in Greek society was relatively mild. The demands 
o£ their gods were not as absolute, the gods themselves not as 
withdrawn and inhuman, as was the case with so many other na-
tions. Emancipation from the tutelage of religion was therefore 
not with the Greeks a primary necessity before they could devote 
their spiritual energies to efforts at a rational understanding of 
reality. The object of their spirit of inquiry was to begin with the 
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external world. Its nature or physis was thought to be a lawful 
order.2 For this the Greeks used the name kosmos. 
In its pure form the idea of the universe as a kosmos may be 
said to be, for us too, the backbone and foundation of a scientific 
view of the world With the Greeks this idea retained a strong 
religious tinge which may seem to us alien. They did not conceive 
of the lawful order of the world as merely a system of factual 
regularities. It was also an ideal or norm of order. As such a 
requirement for order, the idea of kosmos applied also to man and 
society.3 The good or healthy life is life in a city-state (polis) in 
accordance with the natural order of things. The profound analogy 
between the good, the healthy, and the natural is a reflection, 
mediated by Greek medicine, of the kosmos-idea onto the plane of 
ethics and politics. Somewhat generalizingly one could say that 
the central thought of Greek humanism is the conception of Nature 
as Ideal. 
Scholars have noted that the Greek idea of kosmos was in 
origin an extension to the entire universe of an idea of order in 
society.4 Greek humanism too was born in the wake of profound 
social transformations. The old patriarchal order sustained by a 
class of nobles was being replaced by a more democratic and 
egalitarian order laid down in a written law. The idea of a legal 
order, the reign of law in a city-state, was generalized to the idea 
of a world-order, the reign of law throughout the universe. Through 
a second projective move belief in the great cosmic order was then 
transformed into a norm or standard for a good order of society.~~ 
The idea that an order is valid for human affairs by "natural 
law" (physei) and not only by human convention (nomoi) set the 
searchlight for man's quest of himself, his true nature, in Greek 
antiquity. The idea does not by itself, however, give precise di-
1 The Greek word physis does not designate simply external reality. It also 
means something like the essence or principle of a thing. It thus bas the same 
ambiguity as the Latin natura and our word "nature.'' It therefore makes 
sense to say that the physis of (external) nature is a cosmic order. 
• The nature or fJhysis of man is a mikrokosmos, a refiection in him of the 
principles of the universal world-order. 
'Cf. Werner Jaeger, Paideia, the Ideals of Greek Culture, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1946, Vol. I, pp. 110, 117 and passim; also Hans Kelsen, Society and 
Nature, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943, pp. 237, 239 and passim. 
• Jaeger, op. cit., p. 117: "So the physicists' cosmos became, by a curious 
retrogression in thought, the pattern of eunomia in human society, the meta-
physical foundation of dty·state morality.'' 
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rectives for the good life and social order. The light, one could 
say, has no fixed place; therefore following it will lead to where 
the searching thought will take us in creative efforts to determine 
what a life in agreement with nature is like. In the grand philo-
sophical tradition founded by Socrates and continued through 
Plato and Aristotle, Greek humanism reached the peak of its 
creative powers. But with Plato the search terminated in a rather 
different view of the nature of man and of the ideal social order 
from what was the case with Aristotle. Later, with the Stoics and 
the Epicureans, the idea of a life in accordance with nature as-
sumes a less active, more individualistic and introvert character. 
Their humanism is no longer, as was the Socratic tradition, a 
spiritual fight for a better world. It is rather a means of rescue or 
salvation from existing evils-either a teaching of the wisdom of 
acceptance of what fate has in store for us or a recipe for with· 
drawal to the modest pleasures of friendships and private occu-
pations. 
4. One could thus say that in the attempts of the Ancients 
rationally to understand the world, nature was the dominant term 
in the triad nature-man-the supernatural. In the Christian culture 
of the Middle Ages the constellation of the three factors was very 
different. During that millenium the authority of religion, the 
social pressure of the supernatural, was overpowering. Nature lost 
its positive value-load Man as "flesh," i.e., as belonging to nature, 
is a sinful, doomed creature. Man as "soul," i.e., as partner in the 
spiritual realm of the supernatural, can be saved through the grace 
of God. 
Viewed against the background of the Middle Ages, the Renais· 
sance-to use Burckhardt's famous words-meant the rediscovery 
of man and of nature. But man's relationship to nature assumes 
a new character which is partly a Christian inheritance. Nature as 
ideal, as setting a standard for man to follow, is replaced by the 
thought of man as lord and master of nature. As the crown of 
creation, man has power to subjugate nature, to put its forces and 
resources to his service. Therefore the search for laws and principles 
governing nature is not also a search for a norm for a good order 
of human affairs. It is the pursuit of exact knowledge with the 
aid of which man can interfere with and steer the course of nature 
towards goals which he has fixed for himself. The protoscience of 
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the Renaissance is still heavily mixed with magic; magic indeed 
is one of its ancestors. The great example is Paracelsus. His 
younger contemporary Georg Faust became the half-mythical em-
bodiment of this new view of man and his possibilities. It is no 
accident that Doctor Faustus should have become a Leitmotiv of 
European literature from Marlowe to Thomas Mann. When 
purified of magic, the spirit which Faust incarnates is the tech-
nological spirit allied to modern science. 
In the writings of two of the greatest Renaissance umanisti, 
Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, we see the technological spirit 
of Western man emerge.o But the great philosopher who ration-
alized this spirit was Francis Bacon, that colorful figure of the 
late English Renaissance. His name has become associated with 
the slogan "knowledge is power." Bacon was in the first place 
thinking of knowledge of causes. Having ascertained the causes of 
events in nature, we can regulate, i.e., call forth or suppress, those 
events by manipulating, i.e., producing or suppressing, their causes. 
In order to acquire knowledge of causes one has to make experi-
ments. The idea of the scientific experiment, i.e., of interfering 
with the course of nature under controllable and simplified and 
thus in a sense "artificial" or "unnatural" circumstances, is alien to 
typical Greek thinking. The new, exact science of the modern 
era rests on this idea. Experimenting is the form of intellectual 
curiosity most typical of Western "Faustian" man. It had prompted 
the alchemists to search for the Stone of Wisdom which was sup-
posed to bring power and riches. It made Leonardo dream of the 
construction of aircraft for the conquest of space. His aspirations, 
like those of the alchemists, had still to wait some centuries for 
their fulfillment. Of more immediate reward was the curiosity 
which guided the knife of Vesalius in his study of the tissues of 
the living body or the telescope of Galileo in the study of changes 
in the lunar sphere, thought by the Ancients to be immutable and 
• For Ficino, sec P. 0. Kristeller, Renaissance Collccpts of Man, Harper &: 
Row, New York, 1972, p. 10£.: for Pico, see the passage on magic in his Oratio 
de Dignitate Hominis. White magic "when it is rightly pursued, is nothing else 
than the utter perfection of natural philosophy." As black magic "makes man 
the bound slave of wicked powers," so does white magic "make him their ruler 
and their lord." White magic by "applying to each single thing the suitable 
and peculiar inducements .•. brings forth into the open the miracles concealed in 
the recesses of the world, in the depths of nature.'' (Quotations from The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 248f.) 
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untouchable. In this spirit was born modern science with its mani-
fold applications influencing the daily life of men. 
5. The humanists' defense of man's autonomy and dignity 
against the authority of Church and tradition paved the way for 
the new science of nature and for reform in religion. The regnum 
hominis or commonwealth of men envisaged by some of the Renais-
sance humanists was to be a state of affairs where man had emanci-
pated himself from the constraints upon his freedom imposed by 
an inimical nature or by fear of supernatural powers. In our con-
ceptual triad man was going to be sovereign. 
Such an idea of man's independence, however, is not un-
problematic. It is not that as regards man's relation either to the 
supernatural or to nature. 
After the turmoils of the Reformation followed a strengthening 
of religious authority. The Counterreformation reinvigorated 
Catholicism. Protestantism either stiffened into a new orthodoxy 
or was radicalized into forms of puritanism. But the monolithic 
unity of Christianity was gone. In spite of the genuine religious 
zeal of the multiform sectarianism of the post-Reformation era 
and in spite of the impact which reformed Christianity had also 
on worldly affairs, the main stream of development after the Renais-
sance has been towards secularization and liberalization from re-
ligious authority. This development has been aided by a gradual 
penetration of the scientific view of the world in the consciousness 
of the masses and by the growing influence of technology on the 
living conditions of men. Our implicit philosophical anthropology, 
i.e., the view people tend to take for granted about man's natural 
needs and expectations, has become steadily more worldly and 
therewith also more "materialist." 
Will these developments mean that religion will gradually lose 
its position as a major force in history? If that should occur, then 
the third member of our triad-the supernatural-will eventuaiiy 
be of interest only to students of humanity's remoter past. 
It would be premature to answer the question. On the one 
hand I find it difficult, or even next to impossible, to imagine that 
nations which have entered the industrial era and been imbued 
with the values of a scientifico-technological world-view would 
submit to a spiritual authority which promises salvation from the 
miseries of this world on condition that one believes in the strength 
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of a supernatural power. On the other hand, man's longing for 
salvation and willingness to follow blindly the leadership of those 
who promise it has hardly changed substantially. Restoration of 
an order which has grown obsolete-real "reaction"-seldom hap-
pens in history and is of short lasting only. Therefore it seems a 
safe prediction that if religion again will be a molding force in 
history, then it will be a very different religion from the old ones. 
So different perhaps that those who adhere to the old cannot even 
recognize a religion in the new creed. But it may also be the case 
that those who profess the new religion stubbornly refuse to call 
it by that name, since it differs so much from what was religion 
before. Yet the new teaching can be a spiritual force which has 
inherited the place of the gods in the triad of concepts, the two 
other members of which are nature and man.7 
6. Of the two relationships man versus nature and man versus 
the supernatural it is the first, however, which above all is problem-
atic at the historic station where mankind is today. 
The exploitation of nature's resources and the gearing of its 
processes towards human goals means an interference, so to speak, 
with separable units of nature. It is inherent also in the idea of 
experimentation that details of nature be studied under a maximum 
of control and exclusion of disturbing influences from outside the 
experimental situation. But nature is a system or a whole the parts 
of which interact in most complex and intricate ways. Man himself 
is a part of this totality. His life is conditioned by a certain 
equilibrium in his physical environment. If, by interfering with 
the details of nature, man upsets this equilibrium, consequences 
may ensue which are detrimental to human life. Nature as it were 
is "kicking back"-revenging itself on man who has dared to dis-
turb the order inherent in the kosmos. 
One could call this phenomenon by the name nemesis naturae 
or nemesis naturalis.s The idea of nemesis is familiar from Greek 
,. I think that anyone who, as an outside observer, has witnessed the anti-
religious propaganda in some of the socialist countries must have been struck 
by such rellections. Analogies between the mental attitude reflected in Christian 
theology and in Marxist doctrine have often been emphasized-usually to the 
annoyance of both parties. 
0 On the idea of nemesis naturalis d. my paper Essay om naturen, miinniskan 
och den tekniskt-vetenskapliga revolutionen ("Essay on Nature, Man, and the 
Technological-Scientific Revolution'1, Scripta Minora Regiae Societatis Hu· 
maniorum Litterarum Lundensis 1961-1962:2, Lund, 196!1. 
mythology. There it figures parallel to the idea of hybris. The 
hybris of man lies in that pride which transcends the boundaries 
of his real possibilities-for example in the acquisition of riches 
or in the exercise of power. One could say that hybris means up-
setting the lawful balance of the world·order. Nemesis is the restora-
tion of equilibrium, a revenging correction of an illicit interference 
with the kosmos. 
The Greek idea of nemesis was rooted in their religion. By 
his hybris man offends the gods. The gods are the guardians of the 
cosmic order and man is not allowed to upset it with impunity. 
Later the name nemesis divina was used for the punitive inter-
ference of the Christian god with the life of sinful men-for ex-
ample by sending plagues or letting the crops fail. 
The phenomenon to which I am here referring under the 
name nemesis naturae could perhaps be regarded as a secularized 
version of the religious notion of a nemesis divina. The thing in 
question is familiar to all of us. We notice it in our everyday sur-
roundings. The pollution of the rivers, the seas, and the air, the 
erosion of the landscape, the draining of natural resources in rela-
tion to growth in consumption and population-all this reminds 
scientific man with his technological mode of life of his mortal 
nature. The ecological crisis: this is the nemesis naturalis threaten-
ing us. 
The action of men in steering the course of nature and ex-
ploiting its resources is finalistic or goal·directed behavior. The fact 
that nature "kicks back" means that man's purposive activity has 
consequences whic.h are unwelcome, contrary to his wishes-as, 
for example, erosion or pollution. The finality of human action 
in the short perspective may thus turn into counter-finality in the 
longer run-even with suicidal consequences for humanity. 
These familiar phenomena and the problems which they pose 
give a new meaning and a new urgency to the thoughts of the 
Ancients about nature as setting a norm or standard for a well-
ordered life of men and human communities. Nature is a kosmos, 
a lawful whole, the complex internal relationships of which cannot 
be ad libitum meddled with or upset without disastrous conse-
quences. Scientific and technological man is not nature's sovereign 
"lord and commander of the elements," as was said in Marlowe's 
Doctor Faustus. It would be foolish to demand that man renounce 
science and technology. They are his lasting possessions-at least 
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as long as he continues to lead a civilized life. But man has still 
to learn the proper usc of these possessions of his. That is, he has 
to learn how to interfere with nature in the small without upsetting 
its equilibrium in the great, how to arrange the finality of his 
actions so as to forestall possible counter-finality in the conse-
quences. On this view of the human predicament, to live rationally 
and to live in agreement with nature's law are one and the same 
thing. 
7. Nemesis naturae is a metaphor. Nature itself has no pur-
pose and docs not seck to revenge a disturbed balance. The fact 
which is clothed in the metaphor is simply that man through his 
shortsightedness puts in motion natural forces which counteract his 
purposes. 
Nemesis divina was originally not a metaphor. The idea was 
that man through suffering pays compensation for his evil deeds, 
restores so to speak a moral balance which he has upset. But when 
belief in a divine moral order has collapsed or faded out, the idea 
of nemesis divina is either a patent falsehood or a hypocritical 
metaphor. The honest attitude is to admit that man and he alone 
is responsible for keeping upright the moral order. 
Man, who no longer acknowledges a supernatural authority 
and who has learned to effect substantial changes in the biosphere 
and his own living conditions, is thus facing a new task. He has to 
ascertain the limits of his natural powers to realize that he is 
causally chained to a bigger whole than the one which individuals 
can control and direct to serve their immediate whims and wishes. 
A little solemnly one could also say that the secularized man of 
science and technology has to discover who he is. 
8. That rediscovery of man in which Burckhardt saw an 
achievement of the Renaissance was not yet the kind of critical 
self-understanding of which we are now in search. Renaissance 
humanism was, in the first instance, an emancipatory movement 
liberating artistic and intellectual energies in man. 
Neohumanism or the humanism of the Enlightenment, on the 
other hand, can be said to have embarked on the road to a more 
profound self-understanding. As I see it, the importance of the 
neohumanist movement lies partly in the fact that it made man 
and his society a problem. This "problematization" of man is con-
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nected with the great political and social upheaval of the time, 
the French Revolution. 
The Great Revolution was the first in the history of Europe 
in which religious matters had not played a prominent role. (As 
they had even so late as a century earlier in somewhat similar cir-
cumstances in England.) It was the uprising of discontent against 
a decaying order of worldly affairs. It meant the liberation of 
chained and suppressed social forces and it inspired a hope for 
the coming of a true regnum hominis, a reign of humanity and 
reason. 
But the revolution terminated in the madness of le terreur 
and what was left of its ideals was absorbed and disseminated by 
the imperialism of Napoleon. The waves of unrest which the drama 
of external events stirred up in the spiritual realm raged most 
forcefully in German philosophy and poetry of the time. The 
fundamental thought of German neohumanism could perhaps be 
stated as follows: Man unchained is a beast who has to be tamed 
before he attains true freedom. The taming of the beast is the edu-
cation o£ man. The Gennan word Bildung is hard to translate. It 
connotes both the process o£ forcing or shaping man and its result: 
the acquisition o£ a cultured mind.o 
9. The humanism of the Renaissance had acted as midwife 
for the new science of nature. In a somewhat analogous manner 
the humanism of the Enlightenment laid the foundations o£ a new 
science o£ man. It was essentially in the early 19th century that a 
scholarly study o£ history originated which deserves to be called 
"scientific" in the sense of the German word wissenschaftlich. The 
same holds true for classical scholarship, philology, and cultural 
anthropology. Gradually the social sciences too established them-
selves within the academic arena. The reluctance with which the 
word "science" as a name (or these humanistic pursuits has entered 
the English vocabulary is significant and reflects the novelty of the 
• Education as the core of humanist thought is re8ected in such titles as 
Lessing's Die Eniehung des MenschengeschlechtJ and Schiller's Die iisthetische 
Eniehung des Memchen. Rowseau's Emile profoundly aiiectcd ideas on educa· 
tion and bore fruits in several reformist movements such as, for example, the 
one founded by Pestalozzi. Rousseau may also be said to have inaugurated the 
great tradition of the educational novel in the 19th century, exemplified by 
masterpieces of literature like Gottfried Keller's Der griJne Heinrich or Kivi's 
SeitJem.fn veljestil C'Seven Brothers''). 
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change. It is still customary in English to distinguish between the 
arts and the sciences, or between the humanities and the sciences. 
The phrase "humanistic science" retains a faint ring of contradictio 
in adjecto. But these terminological curiosities must not obscure 
a clear recognition of the fact that the 19th century put the study 
of man and of human society on an entirely new footing. This 
process parallels what took place three hundred years earlier with 
regard to the study of nature. Both processes, moreover, are sig-
nificantly connected with the movements we call humanist. 
Will the coming into being of a science of man effect a change 
in man's attitude to himself, comparable to the change in man's 
attitude to nature which accompanied and animated the origins 
of exact natural science? I think one can say, with due caution, 
that we are witnessing the beginnings of such changes in man's 
self-understanding. 
The immediate reflection of the ideals of neohumanism on 
the political level was the liberalism of 19th century bourgeois 
society. john Stuart Mill's On Liberty beautifully echoes Wilhelm 
von Humboldt's thoughts of more than half a century earlier on 
the rights and duties of the state in relation to the human indi-
vidual. But the social idea for which the revival of humanism in 
the longer run was paving the way was socialism. Utopian varieties 
of this idea had been characteristic of social thought already in the 
Renaissance. Thomas More wrote his beautiful vision of the land 
"Nowhere" (Utopia) and Campanella dreamt of a communist "Sun-
state" (Civitas solis). Parallel to the predominantly individualistic 
German neohumanism was the utopian socialism advocated by such 
thinkers in France as Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Fourier or by a re-
former such as Robert Owen. These dreamers and visionaries, how-
ever, differ profoundly from Karl Marx. From the point of view 
of our present theme-What is humanism?-the importance of 
Marx is immense and, I think, still only insufficiently appreciated. 
One could state it summarily by saying that with Marx the idea of 
socialism is coupled with a serious attempt at a scientific under-
standing of history and of man as the subject of the historic process. 
A theory of the dynamics of history is what divides Marx from all 
previous socialist utopias. The scientific view of nature is, for the 
first time, being supplemented by a scientific conception of society. 
From the point of view of their place in the history of ideas it is 
not farfetched to compare Marx to Galileo. 
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In our mid-century and thereafter has emerged a humanist 
movement which calls itself Marxist or socialist humanism. It 
would be premature to try to judge its historic significance. Should 
it be regarded as a continuation and variant of 19th century hu-
manism, or does it signalize a radically new turn in man's progres-
sion towards increased self-understanding? We cannot answer these 
questions, because we cannot yet see things here in the proper his-
torical perspective. But by its very existence the phenomenon in 
question testifies that humanism and its problems have acquired a 
new urgency. It is also obvious that the problems of humanism to-
day are intimately bound up with the social unrest and political 
tensions of the time. 
I 0. I said earlier that every epoch has to define anew the 
humanist attitude. In the rest of my paper I shall make a modest 
proposal on how to cope with this task. 
The humanists of the Renaissance put emphasis on the dignity 
of man and on his independence of received authority in matters of 
truth. The keyword of neohumanism was Bildung; only through 
a process of educating himself can man attain to true freedom. 
I for my part see the meaning of humanism in the defense of some-
thing I propose to call the good of man. 
What is this? To say in concrete terms wherein the good of 
man consists is as little possible as to tell precisely what constitutes 
the dignity of man or what is Bildung, true civilization. The ques-
tion is one of emphasis and of further associations which go with 
the idea. To put stress on the good of man gives to humanism a 
somewhat different tenor from what it has when the dignity and 
independence or the culturing and education of man are being 
stressed. 
One could say that the good of man comprises everything that 
is good for man or does good to him. It is the sum total of the 
conditions for a good life which the given historical situation pro-
vides. That this good is a function of the historical situation means 
that what constitutes the good of man changes in the course of his-
tory. The conditions of happiness, men's demands and expectations 
on life and the possibilities of satisfaction, are different in an in-
dustrial society from what they were in the self-supporting house-
holds of communities of a predominantly agrarian type. If each 
man is to have an equal opportunity for attaining his good, there 
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ought to be equilibrium between the institutional order of society 
and the possibilities of a good life. With substantial changes in 
the possibilities-due, for example, to great technological innova-
tions-the balance threatens to be upset Groups within the society 
try to appropriate for themselves the new amenities by exploiting 
and keeping down other groups. (The same phenomenon repeats 
itself in the relation between nations.) In order to retain or restore 
the balance, structural changes may then be called for in the insti-
tutional frames regulating interhuman relationships. 
A concern for man today respecting his good would emphasize 
human solidarity rather than the self-realization of the individual. 
But these two aspects cannot be sharply separated. The purpose of 
solidarity cannot be other than to safeguard the possibilities of 
individuals to attain their good. If one wishes to put more stress 
on the brotherhood of men or on the self-realization of the indi-
vidual, that too depends on the historical situation. The fact that 
a humanist attitude in our times has to be pronouncedly social, has 
to consider above all interhuman relationships, is a consequence 
of the change in living conditions on earth which technological 
developments and industrialization have brought with them. New 
means of rapid transportation, telecommunication, mass production 
and planned marketing of commodities have led to a hitherto un-
thinkable integration and standardization in expectations, ideals, 
and ways of life all over the globe. Medicine and improved hygiene 
have made possible a population growth which has made living-
space crowded in relation to an increasing scarcity of food, raw ma-
terials, and energy. "Everything depends on everything." We are 
becoming painfully conscious of this old "holistic" truth. When 
all things are interdependent, the equilibrium which is a condition 
of men's possibilities of securing their good, becomes more sus-
ceptible to disturbances and its maintenance increasingly compli-
cated and difficult. 
II. If in humanism one sees a defense of the conditions which 
safeguard the good of man, then it is easy to understand why the 
movements in history which are called "humanist" belong typically 
to times of crisis. 
When society develops evenly-for example during long pe-
riods of internal tranquility accompanied perhaps by successful 
expansion or military conquest beyond the borders-people live 
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in relative equilibrium with their possibilities of a good life. They 
do not collectively experience their situation as problematic or un-
justified. Great sufferings are· not incompatible with such a state 
of affairs. Famines, plagues, even wars are then regarded more 
like catastrophies in nature or attacks by evil forces from outside 
than as causes of justifiable complaint about the way the victims 
themselves have arranged their lives. A change in attitude does not 
happen until the social order begins to totter and ceases to be an 
accepted frame for human relations. 
It is charactetistic of the great changes in history that a kind 
of abyss appears between an old order in a process of decay and a 
new order in process of becoming. From this abyss emerge, beside 
genuinely creative energies working for something new, also anar-
chic forces inimical to any order. They threaten man with chaos 
and destruction. The era of Reformation, the great break between 
the so-called Middle Ages and the New Times, offers an abundance 
of horrifying examples worth forever to be remembered and re-
flected upon: the St. Vitus dancers, the Baptizers, Thomas Miinzer 
and the German peasants' uprisings. The great Swiss writer 
Gottfried Keller says in his story called Ursula, set in the times of 
the Reformation: "Wenn die Religionen sich wenden, so ist es, wie 
wenn die Berge sich auftun; zwischen den grossen Zauberschlangen, 
Golddrachen und Kristallgeistern des menschlichen Gemiites, die 
ans Licht steigen, fahren aile hiisslichen Tazzelwiirmer und das 
Heer der Ratten und Mause hervor." The same army of rats and 
mice also invaded the landscapes of the French Revolution, debas-
ing the noble ideals of freedom and egalitarian brotherhood. The 
socialist revolution in Russia too let loose anarchistic forces, some-
times of noble inspiration: suffice to mention the Kronstadt Com-
mune and the Makhnovchina. The suppression of these revolution-
ary outbursts turned out to be nearly as hard a task for the new 
order as was the crushing of the reactionary forces of the counter-
revolution. Not long ago did we see the same dragon show its claws 
and teeth also in some of the Western countries. Perhaps it was a 
foreboding of approaching chaos. In the West too the erupting 
nihilism appeared as a dark shadow of genuinely progressive social 
forces. The diehards of the students' uprisings in Paris in May 1968 
could have stated their political program in the terms of the 
Makhnovites who had proclaimed that "Only by overthrowing all 
governments, every representative of authority, by destroying all 
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political, economic and authoritarian lies, wherever they are found, 
by destroying the state, by a social revolution, can we introduce a 
true system of workers' and peasants' soviets and advance towards 
socialism."10 But this road paved with negations does not lead to 
a regnum hominis, but to the chaos of universal violence, the realm 
of Caliban or the beast in man. Therefore the fight of humanism 
for the liberation of man must in an equal measure be a fight 
against the .. hassliche Tazzelwiirmer" hiding in man, the devilish 
negations which threaten him with another and worse slavery. 
12. Only in a community where a normative order reigns is 
the good of each member safeguarded. But every lawful order en-
tails limitations, ties on individual freedom. It also demands 
obedience to an authority endowed with coercive power. This au-
thority, however, ought to be legitimate. It should be able to 
justify its claim that it has a right to try to force people to live in 
conformity with the requirements and restrictions set by the nor-
mative frame. In the past it was often thought that the legitimacy 
of state power rested on a supernatural foundation. A remnant of 
this idea survives in the phrase "sovereign by the grace of God" in 
the titles of some monarchs even today. One has also looked for a 
principle of legitimation so to speak "in nature": in the alleged 
cultural, intellectual, or physical superiority of a conquering nation 
or ruling class. Related to it is the thought that some nations by 
virtue of their factual influence on world affairs also have a special 
"duty" or "mission" to uphold and safeguard an international 
order which cements or widens their own influence. The humanist 
attitude in these matters can be condensed in the formula: The 
sole legitimation of political power and social influence is concern 
for the good of man. 
This is by no means a novel idea. Its theoretical foundations 
were laid by Plato and Aristotle. It runs like a Leitmotiv through 
political thought since the Renaissance-from Suarez to Rousseau 
and after. In practice, an appeal to this source of legitimacy of 
power has been made whenever people have risen against an op-
pressive and unjust rule. The principle could be said to constitute 
the implicit ideology of any liberation movement worthy of the 
10 Quoted according to Gabriel and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Commu-
nism and the Left-Wing Jlltemative, Penguin Books, London, 1969, p. 222. 
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name. It is a vision of an improved society, which gives men a 
right to overturn an order which has estranged itself from their 
needs and expectations or to resist the demands of an alien intruder. 
But once the champions of liberation have been installed as 
rulers they may themselves deny the source which legitimated their 
assumption of power. This seldom, if ever, happens openly. Those 
who have overthrown a tyrant do not easily recognize in themselves 
a new oppressor. In building their own power fabric they, on the 
contrary, continue to make appeal to the same principle of legiti-
mation: the good of those over whom they rule. Appeal to this 
good then becomes a disguise for the rulers' selfish aspirations. 
When this happens, a humanism fighting for the good of man 
breaks its alliance, if there ever was one, with the new rulers; and 
the rulers will be prone to do the same with the champions of 
humanism. 
13. The phenomenon which I have in mind here is related 
to that which Marx and Engels called "false consciousness" or 
"ideology." If the humanist attitude is characterized in positive 
terms as a defense of the good of man, one might characterize it in 
negative terms as a fight against false legitimation of power. This 
fight, moreover, has to be fought on two frontiers. It is a fight 
against an alienated and obsolete order in which brute power is 
being veiled in a false ideology. But it is also a fight against a new 
order which has established itself in the place of an old one, when-
ever this order threatens to ossify and become a power-instrument 
for group-interests be it those of a state bureaucracy or of the mili-
tary or of an industrial technocracy. In all these cases what the 
humanist is fighting are attempts to usurp coercive power for pur-
poses other than the good of the citizens. 
In its efforts to debunk false consciousness the humanist atti-
tude enters into conflict with naked power-and in times of radical 
change with both of two mutually opposed powers, viz., the power 
of a fading and that of a nascent order. The guardians of the 
former see in the fighting humanist an intellectual who undermines 
the established society, an idealist knight errant who acts as mid-
wife of the revolution but who is himself destined to perish in the 
vortex of revolutionary chaos or in the prisons of the tyrants he 
helped to power. Those again who with enormous effort and sacri-
fice have established a new order suspect the humanist as a half-
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hearted fellow traveler, fear him as a potential critic, or accuse 
him of being a handmaid of a counter-revolution in preparation. 
The humanist thus holds a peculiar middle position between 
the old and the new, the past and the future. He belongs to both 
and at the same time he belongs to neither. This, the humanist's 
perpetual dilemma, is movingly illustrated in the person of one of 
the greatest humanists of the Renaissance and of all times, Erasmus. 
The papacy feared him as a merciless scolder of an obsolete spiritual 
inheritance and critic of a power which was exploiting the credulity 
of the masses for unworthy purposes. By undermining the authority 
of the Church Erasmus paved the way for the reform work of 
Luther. But Erasmus could not approve of Luther's definite and 
uncompromising break with his adversaries. He was a traditionalist 
who neither could nor wanted to surrender that which he thought 
genuine and valuable in the inheritance from the past. Like Luther, 
Erasmus feared and detested the forces of anarchy erupting from 
the abyss which the revolution in religion had opened. But Erasmus 
resented in equal measure the way those who established a new 
order in religion tried to legitimize coercive power to check anarchic 
social forces-as witness the cruel suppression of the peasants' up-
risings in Germany. In so many regards Erasmus differed from 
Luther. Therefore the fighting reformation loathed Erasmus, re-
garding him as a vacillating weakling between the old and the new. 
His attitude was thought to give moral support to the reaction and 
to encourage doubts and fears in a situation where what was 
needed was uncompromising rejection of the old and an unshakable 
faith in a new order. 
14. "Ich hab' mein Sach auf nichts gestellt." This is not the 
war-cry of a nihilist, but a formula in which Goethe once condensed 
his wisdom of life. When understood in the spirit of Goethe, the 
words might serve as a motto for what in this paper I have called 
the humanist attitude. The words allude to the radical non-align-
ment, the independence of mind which is characteristic of this at-
titude. From what has been said it ought to be clear, however, 
that independence does not amount to a denial of every binding 
norm or order. It goes, on the contrary, together with a critical 
belief in the necessity of order-but also with an insight into its 
mutable nature. The sage whom we so often have reason to quote 
when talking about these matters spoke of "dynamic order" (dy-
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namische Ordnung). The humanist is prepared to reject anything 
which fetters or limits man's freedom to live in agreement with ex-
isting possibilities for a dignified human life-knowing, however, 
that freedom can endure only under the reign of a humane order 
which derives its legitimacy from concern for the good of man. 
The question may be raised: What role has the humanist atti-
tude played as a force in history? Has its concern for man done any 
good to men? I would answer the question as follows: 
A lasting achievement of the humanist movements is that they 
have given birth to and nourished a rational attitude to reality. 
When systematically cultivated this attitude is what we call science. 
Of the alliance between humanism and scientific study history gives 
threefold testimony. The origin of a scientific view of the world 
in ancient Greece is connected with efforts to find an ideal and 
norm for the good life in a polis in harmony with the cosmic order. 
It was not, however, until after the reawakening of humanism dur-
ing the Renaissance that the foundations were laid for an under-
standing in exact terms of natural processes and therewith for the 
possibility of steering these processes with the aid of a scientific 
technology. The humanist movement of the Enlightenment, finally, 
completed the rational approach to reality by giving birth to the 
humanities, i.e., to the systematic study of man as a being of culture. 
Science, in the broad sense of the German Wissenschaft, is thus 
an offshoot of humanism. But a scientific attitude is not the same 
as a humanist attitude. Science can be used for purposes which are 
contrary to humanism. This is true of the humanist sciences too. 
The spirit of free creation, however, which animates the scientific 
enterprise, is ultimately the same as the faith of humanism in man's 
possibilities to discover, by critical scrutiny, the conditions under 
which the good life can be realized at a given station in the history 
of man. If by progress we mean change in accordance with reason, 
one can say that the continued existence of a humanist attitude is a 
prerequisite of true progress. 
There are periods in history when it seems as if mankind could 
not afford to listen to the voices which plead the cause of the good 
of man and question the legitimacy of existing coercive power. 
Under such glacial periods of humanity, the face of mankind is 
more reminiscent of the face of Caliban than of the face we believe 
to be man's own. I could imagine that we are now living on the 
threshold to such a period. I am not then thinking so much on 
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the present situation with its many ominous signs as on the retro-
grade steps already taken in this century towards the abyss of in-
humanity. In such times humanism faces the task of hibernating, 
so to speak. During the iron centuries of late Antiquity Socratic 
humanism was transformed into the escapist wisdom of life of the 
Epicureans and the acquiescence in fate of the Stoics. These atti· 
tudes may be regarded as secularized forms of that same longing for 
salvation which, in the fullness of time, in the guise of the Christian 
religion took hold of the masses and became a new power molding 
world history. Is the fate of humanism in the centuries ahead of us 
going to be similar? We cannot answer the question. But we may 
intimate a reasoned hope. My hope is that humanism will survive 
and continue as a kind of protest movement of the human spirit, 
as a voice that can be heard wherever men are persecuted for their 
convictions and power seeks legitimacy in the disguise of a false 
consciousness. As long as mankind feels ill at ease at the thought 
of the deeds of its oppressors and torturers there is a hope that the 
telos of man's path through history is an earthly regnum hominis. 
If, on the other hand, it is accepted as the natural order of things 
that man has either to kill or to perish, then man has denied himself 
and is building the kingdom of Caliban. 
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